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Despite current California truancy laws, school absences have
remained a largely unsolved problem. According to the California
Department of Education, over 1.5 million students were truant in the
2008-2009 school year.' This number represents almost one quarter
of the California student body, with nearly forty percent of these
truants being elementary school students.2 This problem intensifies
after examining the correlation between truancy and juvenile
delinquency and the subsequent costs on society. In 2008, the Center
for Social Organization of Schools at John Hopkins University found
that poor elementary school attendance is one of the most reliable
predictors of who will drop out in high school.' In California, this is
particularly worrisome considering three-fourths of prison inmates
are high school dropouts.4 A 2009 report, published by the University
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3. KIM NAUER ET AL., CENTER FOR NEW YORK CITY AFFAIRS, THE NEW
SCHOOL, STRENGTHENING SCHOOLS BY STRENGTHENING FAMILIES: COMMUNITY
STRATEGIES TO REVERSE CHRONIC ABSENTEEISM IN THE EARLY GRADES AND
IMPROVE SUPPORTS FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 5 (2008), available at http://
www.newschool.edu/milano/nycaffairs/documents/StrengtheningSchoolsReport.pdf
4. SENATE COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, 2009-10 REG. SESS., S.B. 1317 BILL ANALYSIS
7 (Cal. Apr. 20, 2010).
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of California at Santa Barbara California Dropout Research Project,
estimates "the annual juvenile crime loss associated with high school
dropouts at $1.1 billion."' Clearly, truancy is a serious problem that
leads to negative future consequences for a child and society at-large.
Truancy is not just a "California" problem. Across the country,
numerous cities and counties have begun criminally prosecuting
parents of truant children in an effort to address the problem.
6 In
2010, California affirmatively joined this movement statewide by
enacting Senate Bill 1317-legislation solely and explicitly aimed at
criminally prosecuting the parents of truant students.! The new law,
Penal Code section 270.1, makes parents criminally liable for the
chronic truancy of their elementary school children. While it is
indisputable that some form of action is necessary, it is less certain
whether punishing parents is the correct policy and action for the
state to take.
Most people point the finger at parents when a child is
delinquent. One study found that sixty-nine percent of respondents
believe parents are most responsible when a teenager commits a
crime.' Some argue that if parents become more involved in their
5. Clive R. Belfield & Henry M. Levin, High School Dropouts and the Economic
Losses from Juvenile Crime in California, UNIV. OF CAL., SANTA BARBARA, CAL.
DROPOUT RESEARCH PROJECT abstract (Sept. 2009), http://www.cbcse.org/media/
download-gallery/Clive%20researchreportl6.pdf.
6. See, e.g., Mom held on truancy charges, SPOKANE DAILY CHRON., Nov. 19, 1980,
at 10, available at http://news.google.com/newspapersid=aGVOAAAAIBAJ&sjid=S-
kDAAAAIBAJ&dq=truancy %20arrest&pg=6289%2C5000594; Parents Arrested on
Truancy Charges, WAYCROSS JOURNAL-HERALD, Feb. 8, 1988, at 9, available at http://
news.google.com/newspapers?id=gl5aAAAAIBAJ&sjid=2kwNAAAAIBAJ&dq=truanc
y%20arrest&pg=5335%2C5029699; 15 Parents of 'Habitual Truants' Arrested, NEWS4
JAX.COM (May 6, 2008), http://www.news4jax.com/education/16175110/detail.html?treets=
jax&taf=jax; Tristan Smith, Parents of Truant Kids Can Face Jail Time, CNN.COM (Oct.
24, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/10/24/truancy.arrests/index.html?iref=all
search; Mary Schuken, Alaska Targets Truancy to Boost Rural Student Performance,
EDUC. WEEK (Sept. 1, 2010), http:/Iblogs.edweek.orgledweek/ruraleducation/2010/09/
alaska-targets-truancy-to-boostrural_ studentperformance.html; 45 People Arrested in
Truancy Warrant Roundup, YOURCLEVELANDNEWS.COM (Aug. 6, 2010),
http://www.yourhoustonnews.com/cleveland/news/articlec590402f-dc5-5523-a34a-7de30
262ac47.html.
7. Prior to S.B.1317, criminal liability for minors' truancy was only possible under
California Penal Code section 272, a general parental responsibility statute that has
existed for some time, but does not allow for straightforward prosecution of parents of
truants. Section 270.1 introduces an explicit focus on penal punishment for chronic
truancy. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
8. Eve M. Brank & Victoria Weisz, Paying for the Crimes of Their Children: Public
Support of Parental Responsibility, 32 J. CRIM. JUST. 465, 469 (2004) (68.7 percent of
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child's life or exert greater control over their child, then the child will
be less delinquent.! Parental responsibility laws are an attempt by the
state to make parents take such action.' Despite this logical step, the
same study also found that respondents appeared "less willing to
support blaming or punishing the parents."" While the study did not
explore reasons for the decline in support, one possible explanation is
that people recognize parenting is a difficult task, and that parents
should be allowed some freedom to raise their children as they see fit,
despite possible mistakes or blunders.
This notion of freedom or autonomy in childrearing is focal to
the continuous debate over state versus parental authority to govern a
child's educational upbringing. Some scholars argue that vouchers and
charter schools are positive signs that parents are winning this debate. 2
respondents answered "parents" when asked "when a teenager commits a crime, which of
the following is most responsible, in addition to the teenager?").
9. See infra note 11.
10. See, e.g., Leslie Joan Harris, An Empirical Study of Parental Responsibility Laws:
Sending Messages, but What Kind and to Whom?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 5, 7-8 (2006) ("The
laws' explicit premise is that much teenage lawbreaking and troublemaking is attributable
to parents' failure to exert appropriate control over their children. The laws implicitly
assume that an appropriate way to motivate parents is direct state intervention that
defines reasonable parenting and imposes sanctions on parents who fail to meet this
standard."); Naomi R. Cahn, Pragmatic Questions About Parental Liability Statutes, 1996
Wis. L. REV. 399, 409-10 (1996) (The legislators' goals with parental liability statutes
include "involving parents in their child's life, affixing personal responsibility for criminal
behavior, and attempting to decrease escalating rates of juvenile crime. By holding
parents responsible for their child's actions, these laws seek improved parental control
over their child. . . . The underlying and highly questionable assumption of such laws is
that parents can control their child.").
11. See Brank & Weisz, supra note 8, at 473. Also, after the school shootings in
Littleton, Colorado, CNN conducted a Gallup poll. Of the 659 adults surveyed, 51%
placed a great deal of blame on parents for the events that occurred. Parents only came
second to the availability of guns, on which 61% of respondents placed a great deal of
blame. Only 53% of American parents believed the government and society could take
effective action to prevent such an event, even though a stronger majority reported fearing
for the safety of their children at school. Poll: More Parents Worried About School Safety,
CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll, (Apr. 22, 1999, 12:23 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/ALL
POLITICS/stories/1999/04/22/school.violence.poll/.
12. See Emily Buss, The Adolescent's Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control
Between Parent and State, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 1233, 1235-36 (2000) ("In 1983, the National
Commission on Excellence in Education reported to Congress that public schools
reflected a 'rising tide of mediocrity that threaten[ed] our very future as a Nation and a
people.' At the same time, schools were coming under increasing attack by organizations
associated with religious conservatives for their secular humanist teachings, and their
promotion of 'tolerance,' which was viewed as antithetical to many religious teachings.
Together, these attacks . . . inspired parents to demand greater control over educational
choices affecting their children. Policymakers have been increasingly responsive to these
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On the other hand, it seems that local and state policymakers have
successively been chipping away at parental autonomy by exerting
greater control over school attendance through parental
responsibility laws.13
Although the Supreme Court recognizes that the parent-child
relationship encompasses parents' fundamental right to autonomy in
childrearing, the State's interest in protecting the welfare of children
keeps the Court from applying strict scrutiny to cases that infringe
upon that right. What results is a balancing test wherein the court
weighs the reasonableness of a parent's childrearing decision and the
reasonableness of the state's infringement on parental autonomy.
This note will argue that under the Court's balancing test, section
270.1 is invalid.
Part I of this paper will explain the state of California truancy
laws, and Part II will detail the political underpinnings of section
270.1. Part III will present the historical development of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence on parental autonomy in childrearing, and
discuss the competing interests at stake. Part IV will present an
analysis of the Court's jurisprudence on the parent-child relationship,
so as to better ascertain the Court's standard of review. Part V will
apply the Court's standard to section 270.1. Lastly, Part VI will
discuss viable options to combat truancy.
I. California Truancy Laws
The California Education Code identifies stages of truancy that
carry corresponding levels of state intervention and punishment. The
truancy stage of a student correlates to the number of unexcused
absences the student accumulates during a school year.14 An
unexcused absence occurs whenever a student is tardy or absent for
more than thirty minutes without a valid excuse." Prior to enactment
demands."); see also id. at 1237-38 (discussing vouchers and charter schools is a reaction
to parental demands).
13. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
14. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48260(a) (West 2011) (the definition of truancy limits
accumulation of unexcused absences to those absences that occur in one school year).
15. Id. A valid excuse includes the following: illness; quarantine under the direction
of a county or city health officer; for medical, dental, optometric or chiropractic services;
attending the funeral of an immediate family member; jury duty; illness or medical
appointment of a child when the student is the custodial parent; and for justifiable
personal reasons when the student's absence is requested in writing by the parent and
approved by an appropriate school official, such as observance of a religious holiday or
attendance at an educational conference offered by a nonprofit organization. Id. § 48205(a).
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of Senate Bill 1317, there were two truancy stages: truancy and
habitual truancy.
A. Truancy
Any student with three unexcused absences is a truant, and will
be reported to the attendance supervisor or superintendent of the
school district.6  After the student is labeled a truant, the school
district must mail a letter to inform the parent of the student's
truancy. 7  This letter must also inform the parent of alternative
educational programs, their right to meet with school personnel to
discuss solutions, and possible legal ramifications for both the student
and the parent if the student continues to miss class) 8  Upon
subsequent unexcused absences, a school may assign a student to an
afterschool or weekend study program.
Once a student is labeled a truant, the governing board of a
school district may investigate and refer the parent to a school
attendance review board ("SARB").20 If the parent "continually and
willfully fails to respond to directives of the SARB or services
provided, the SARB shall direct the school district to make and file in
the proper court a criminal complaint." 2' The parent will be guilty of
an infraction, and fined up to $100 upon first conviction, up to $250
upon second conviction, and up to $500 for all subsequent
22convictions. In lieu of fines, participating counties have the option
of allowing the court to order the parent to participate in an
education or counseling program.23 It should be noted, however, that
this option is only available in counties where these programs exist.
16. EDUC. § 48260(a)
17. Id. § 48260.5.
18. Id. § 48260.5(c)-(g).
19. Id. § 48264.5(b).
20. See Truancy, CAL. DEP'T OF EDUC., http://www.cde.ca.gov/ls/ai/tr/ (last visited
Nov. 4, 2011). SARBs are "composed of representatives from various youth-serving
agencies, [and] help truant or recalcitrant students and their parents or guardians solve
school attendance and behavior problems through the use of available school and
community resources." School Attendance Review Boards, CAL. DEP'T OF EDUC., http://
www.cde.ca.gov/ls/ai/sb/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2011).
21. EDUC. § 48291 (alteration in original).
22. Id. § 48293(a)(1)-(3).
23. Id. § 48293(a)(3).
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B. Habitual Truancy
After the student accumulates five unexcused absences and a
school employee has made a conscientious effort to meet with the
parent and student, the student is deemed a habitual truant.24 Once
labeled a habitual truant, the student may be referred to a SARB or
the county probation department.25 After referral is made, the parent
must be notified in writing of the following: 1) the name and address
of the relevant SARB; 2) the reason for referral; and 3) the
requirement of the parent and student to attend a hearing."
The SARB or the county probation department may order the
student to participate in a community service program. 27 However,
this option is only available in the counties that provide such
programs.28 If none are available or the student previously failed to
participate in such a program, the student can be referred to a
probation officer or district attorney mediation program (if the
county provides one) where the parent and student meet with an
officer or attorney to discuss the possible legal consequences and
solutions.29
If the student misses school again (i.e., accumulates six
unexcused absences), the student is deemed to be within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.30 The juvenile court may adjudge
the pupil to be a ward of the court and order one or more of the
following: 1) twenty to forty community service hours; 2) a fine of
$100 or less; 3) attendance at a court-approved truancy prevention
program; and 4) a one-year suspension or delay of the student's
driver's license.
At the same time the student falls within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court, the parent can be held criminally liable under Penal
Code section 272.32 If the parent causes or encourages a student to
have six or more unexcused absences-either through positive action
or failure to exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection, and
control-then the parent is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a
24. Id § 48262.




29. E.g., EDUC. §§ 48264.5(c), 48263.
30. Id. § 48264.5(d).
31. Id. § 48264.5(d)(1)-(4).
32. See infra note 34.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 39:2544
IMPERMISSIBLY CRIMINALIZING TRUANCY 545
fine of up to $2,500 or imprisonment in county jail for up to a year.
Thus, section 272 holds parents of habitual truants criminally liable
for contributing to the truancy of their children.
If the parent is charged with a misdemeanor, then the parent can
ask to waive their right to a trial and be considered for a diversion
program.3 The probation department will investigate the parent's
eligibility, and make a recommendation to the court. If approved,
the parent may be ordered to pay the cost of the program. Upon
completion of the program, the arrest will be wiped from the parent's
record.
C. Chronic Truancy Under Section 270.1
Despite the breadth of the aforementioned truancy provisions,
school absences remained a largely unsolved problem." Considering
the negative consequences of truancy for a child's future and society
at-large," policymakers took action and drafted section 270.1.
On September 30, 2010, Senate Bill 1317 was passed," and
subsequently, went into effect on January 1, 2011.41 It identified yet
42another truancy stage: chronic truancy. A student can become a
chronic truant if "absent from school without a valid excuse for 10
percent or more of the school days in one school year." 43 Senate Bill
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272(a)(1) (West 2011) ("Every person who commits any act
or omits the performance of any duty, which act or omission causes or tends to cause or
encourage any person under the age of 18 years to come within the provisions of Section
300, 601, or 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code ... is guilty of a misdemeanor . . .").
The Welfare and Institutions Code section 601(b) includes students with four or more
truancies. Also, the California Supreme Court has held that under Penal Code section
272(a)(2), parents "have the duty to exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection, and
control . . . ." Therefore, "parents violate section 272 when they omit to perform their
duty of reasonable 'supervision' and 'control' and that omission results in the child's
delinquency." Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507, 512 (Cal. 1993).
34. PENAL § 1001.70-72. However, the parent must not have previously been
diverted or failed to complete a probation or parole sentence.
35. Id. § 1001.72(a).
36. Id. § 1001.73.
37. Id. § 1001.75(a).
38. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
39. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
40. Senate Bill 1317, 2010 Leg., 2009-10 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) [hereinafter S.B. 1317].
41. See Overview of Legislative Process, OFFICIAL CAL. LEGISLATIVE INFO., http://
www.leginfo.ca.gov/bil2lawx.html ("Most bills go into effect on the first day of January of
the next year."). Senate Bill 1317 was passed on September 30, 2010.
42. Id.
43. EDUC. § 48263.6.
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1317 also created a new misdemeanor offense for parents of chronic
truants in kindergarten through eighth grade-section 270.1. It
holds parents of chronic truants criminally liable if they fail to
reasonably supervise or encourage their child's attendance.4 5
Despite the mainly punitive aspect of section 270.1, there are two
guaranteed safeguards. First, the parent cannot be held criminally
liable under both Penal Code section 272 and section 270.1.46 Second,
the parent must be offered language accessible support services prior
to being charged. 47  Additionally, the code incorporates a third
possible protection to parents from state encroachment: A deferred
entry of judgment program.48 The list of required elements of this
program include: 1) a dedicated court calendar; 2) leadership by a
judge; 3) periodic meetings with school district representatives; 4)
service referrals for parents, including case management, mental and
physical health services, parenting classes, substance abuse treatment,
and child care and housing; 5) a clear statement that if the parent
complies with the program, charges will be dropped; 6) a clear
statement that if the parent fails to comply, judgment will be entered;
and 7) an explanation of the parent's rights in relation to their
criminal record and the program.49 Unfortunately, section 270.1 does
not require a county to offer the program,"o and even if the county
chooses to do so, it is barred from using any state money to fund the
program." Therefore, section 270.1's deferred entry of judgment
program-the only aspect that does not focus on prosecution to
44. PENAL § 270.1; see generally S.B. 1317.
45. PENAL § 270.1(a) ("A parent or guardian of a pupil of six years of age or more
who is in kindergarten or any of grades 1 to 8, inclusive, and who is subject to compulsory
full-time education or compulsory continuation education, whose child is a chronic truant
as defined in Section 48263.6 of the Education Code, who has failed to reasonably
supervise and encourage the pupil's school attendance, and who has been offered
language accessible support services to address the pupil's truancy, is guilty of a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by
imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or by both that fine and
imprisonment.").
46. Id. § 270.1(d).
47. Id. § 270.1(a).
48. Id. § 270.1(b).
49. Id.
50. Id. ("A superior court may establish a deferred entry of judgment program . . .
(emphasis added).
51. Id. § 270.1(c) ("Funding for the deferred entry of judgment program pursuant to
this section shall be derived solely from nonstate sources.").
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reduce truancy-is not guaranteed or financially encouraged by the
state.
It is important to note that prior to the enactment of section
270.1, a parental liability law for parents of habitual truants already
existed in section 272. It is unclear how section 270.1 will produce
better or different results than section 272. There are a few possible
explanations. First, section 270.1 could allow for easier prosecution
of parents. District attorneys have reported difficulty using section
272 against parents of truants because it requires a heightened burden
of proof and school district documentation is not always complete.52
As explained by Alameda County Deputy District Attorney, Teresa
Drenick, section 270.1 will give district attorneys "more teeth and
more tools." 3
Second, section 270.1 could be an effort to establish a statewide,
uniform system for addressing serious elementary school truancy.
The Senate Committee on Public Safety's review of Senate Bill 1317
revealed a lack of cohesion in judicial responses when parents of
truants are charged under section 272:
Some courts take a punitive approach that may levy a fine or
jail time on the parent, but may not result in the return of the
child to school, while others may not take these charges
seriously, given the gravity of other criminal offenses being
addressed, and may throw out the cases with no changed
circumstances for the child.54
While it is unclear how the punitive approach taken by section
270.1 will result in the return of children to school, section 270.1
explicitly puts parental responsibility for truancy in the penal code
and is a clear legislative mandate of the state's intention to prosecute
parents.
II. Political Underpinnings of Section 270.1
Senate Bill 1317 was authored by Senator Mark Leno, Chair of
the Senate Public Safety Committee, and sponsored by San Francisco
52. A Review of California's Compulsory Education Laws, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S
OFFICE (Feb. 2004), http://www.1ao.ca.gov/2004/compulsory-ed/020304_compulsory-
education laws.htm.
53. Katy Murphy, California Truancy Bill Would Crack Down on Parents of Truant
Schoolchildren, OAKLAND TRIB. (Aug. 18,2010), http://www.kamalaharris.org/news/718.
54. SENATE COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, 2009-10 REG. SESS., S.B. 1317 BILL ANALYSIS
9 (Cal. June 22, 2010).
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District Attorney Kamala Harris." According to Kamala Harris,
Senate Bill 1317 was inspired by her successful Chronic Truancy
Reduction Initiative ("CTRI")." In 2008, Harris initiated CTRI in
San Francisco, and in January of 2010, she published a white paper
describing CTRI and documenting its results.5 ' The paper also
assessed the need for similar reform on the state level, and
recommended that the state use CTRI as a model.
According to Harris' paper, CTRI consists of a "three-stage
pyramid approach" of widespread education, intervention, and
prosecution. In partnership with the school district, the widespread
education effort includes posters, local media, school-wide forums,
letters to every parent at the beginning of the school year, and a
hotline for parents that is advertised on public busesi 0  The
intervention strategy includes identification by the school district of
students whose "attendance is beginning to fall off," and a subsequent
mediation with the parent, school administrators, and prosecutors.61
The purpose of these mediations is for parents to understand the
consequences of their child's absence, and for all parties to work
62
together to build solutions. Counselors and service providers are
61also on hand to offer support.
Lastly, prosecution is directed toward the parents of children
whose attendance has not improved after the intervention and who
have missed twenty or more school days." It should be noted,
55. Kamala Harris, State Should Follow San Francisco Example on Truancy
Prevention, San Jose Mercury News, Sept. 16, 2010, at Opinion.
56. See id.
57. KAMALA D. HARRIS, S.F. DIST. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, PAY ATTENTION Now
OR PAY THE PRICE LATER: How REDUCING ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TRUANCY




58. See id. at 3-4 ("[W]e need to get serious about getting our young children in
school. . . . I joined with the San Francisco Unified School District to begin a
comprehensive initiative focused on elementary school truancy. . . . Our strategy has
worked.").
59. Id. at 9.
60. Id. at 9-10.
61. In Harris's own words, "[tjhese mediations work. Without hauling a single parent
to court, we saw attendance at one school improve 40 percent among the students whose
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however, that prosecution is not the only focus even in the
prosecution stage. According to Harris,
We do not simply require these parents to pay a fine and send
them home. We recognize that for parents of severely chronic
truants simply paying a fine will not likely result in improved
attendance. Instead, we developed formal working
relationships with the school district, Child Protective Services,
and children and family service providers to compel these
parents to address the underlying problems resulting in chronic
65truancy.
Parents are given three options in Truancy Court:" plead guilty
and pay the fine, plead guilty and enter a deferred entry of judgment
program, or plead not guilty.67 According to Harris, most choose the
deferred entry of judgment program.
CTRI was very successful among elementary students. In 2009,
student truancy in elementary schools in the San Francisco Unified
School District dropped by twenty percent. Unfortunately, there are
several differences between section 270.1 and CTRI. First, section
270.1 does not implement an education campaign. There is no hotline
for concerned parents, and parents do not receive a letter at the
beginning of the school year emphasizing the importance of school
attendance and the legal consequences of truancy. Second, mediation
is essential in CTRI, but under current truancy laws, it is only
available to parents located in counties that possess such programs.o
Section 270.1 did nothing to require or ensure its provision. Lastly,
while CTRI provides the deferred entry of judgment option to all
parents, under state law, this option is only available to parents in
counties that voluntarily create and finance the program. Therefore,
while section 270.1 was inspired by a successful multi-pronged
approach, it fails to implement many integral pieces of that approach.
Instead, it implements only one stage-prosecution.
According to the Public Counsel Law Center, who argued in
opposition to Senate Bill 1317, prosecution is the most harmful stage
65. Id. at 11-12.
66. The Truancy Court of San Francisco is a specialized court "that combines close
court monitoring with tailored family services." Id. at 4.
67. Id. at 12.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 5.
70. EDUC. §§ 48263, 48264.5(c).
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for the parent and community." This intrusion into parental
autonomy in childrearing-a fundamental right under the United
States Supreme Court's substantive due process doctrine-calls for an
assessment of section 270.1's validity under constitutional doctrine.
III. Historical Development of the Constitutional Doctrine on
the Parent-Child Relationship
Prior to the late nineteenth century, "state involvement in the
family was minimal," and parents enjoyed broad autonomy.72 With
the Progressive Movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries came more state involvement, including child labor and
compulsory education laws. Due to this newfound state
involvement, a need arose to clarify the proper role and authority of
parents versus the state in childrearing.74 The Supreme Court played
a major role in developing the framework that governs this area of
law, starting with the establishment of parental autonomy in
childrearing as a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Typically, strict scrutiny is the standard of review when a statute
is challenged as infringing on a fundamental right such as parental
autonomy.76 However, the Court has consistently departed from this
standard of review in parent-child relationship cases, mainly due to a
71. SENATE COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, 2009-10 REG. SEss., S.B. 1317 BILL ANALYSIS
15 (Cal. June 22, 2010) ("The sole purpose of imposing fines as high as $2,000 and
sentences as long as one year in county jail is to punish, rather than help the parent or
guardian achieve better parenting, which would help both the parent and the
community."). The Public Counsel Law Center also said Senate Bill 1317 would "increase
court involvement for poor families and creates contentious relationships between parents
and schools." Id. at 21.
72. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 1128 (5th
ed. 2010).
73. Id.
74. See id. at 1127 ("[F]ederal constitutional law has played a major role in
delineating the proper roles and authority of parents versus the state in the lives of
children.").
75. See id. at 1129 ("In response to the trend of expanded state involvement in the
family, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified that parental autonomy in childrearing is
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
76. CALVIN R. MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND
LIBERTIES 471 (3d ed. 2009) ("Contemporary substantive due process proceeds on two
tracks. Courts first determine whether a claimed right is a fundamental liberty. If so, a
law infringing upon the right will be subjected to strict scrutiny.").
77. As David D. Meyer notes, the first family privacy cases do not articulate a strict
scrutiny standard of review, but the cases also predated the Court's doctrine on strict
[Vol. 39:2550 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
concern for the welfare of children." The Court recognizes the need
for state intervention at times to protect the well-being of children,
and allows for such in its doctrine.7 9 Unfortunately, the Court has
never clarified the exact standard under which to assess the
competing interests of parents and the state." On the one hand, it
propounds and reveres the role and autonomy of parents in
childrearing. While on the other hand, it firmly asserts state authority
to protect child welfare."
What results from the Court's jurisprudence is an undefined
form of heightened scrutiny that falls short of strict scrutiny.' Some
scholars argue that "the Court seems to apply a more free-form
'reasonableness' test to government actions that impede a parent's
child-rearing authority, implicitly calibrating the level of scrutiny in
each case to match the particular degree of intrusion upon the
parents' interests."83 Another approach adjusts the Court's standard
of review based on whether or not it agrees with parents' child-
scrutiny. David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 544
(2000). Subsequently, "[t]he Court has used the familiar language of strict scrutiny-
'compelling' interest and 'narrow tailoring'-in only a few of its cases dealing with the
rights of parents.... In a much greater number of cases, the Court seems to apply a more
free-form 'reasonableness' test to government actions that impede a parent's child-rearing
authority...." Id. at 546.
78. See id. at 545-46 ("In recent decades, the Court has stated repeatedly that a
parent has a 'fundamental liberty interest' in 'the companionship, care, custody, and
management of his or her children.' And yet the Court in those cases, still torn between
the competing metaphors of family as haven and as hell, stops short of embracing strict
scrutiny as the governing standard.").
79. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 72, at 1127 ("[Tlhe state monitors the parent-child
relationship and may intervene when such intervention is deemed necessary to the state's
parens patriae interests in protecting and promoting the welfare of children. The state
may also restrict parental autonomy in order to promote societal interests (i.e. its police
power goals), such as helping children grow into well-educated and productive citizens.").
80. Meyer, supra note 77, at 545 ("In large part, the Court's parental-rights cases
remain profoundly murky regarding the balance they strike between private and
communal interests in childrearing because they rest uncomfortably upon two competing
and as-yet-unreconciled metaphors: the family as a 'private refuge' from a brutal or
indifferent community and the state as 'protector' of children from a brutal or indifferent
family.") (emphasis added). See also David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy
After Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1125, 1163 (2001) (while the Court is moving
toward a middle-ground standard of review in family privacy cases, "the cases are anything
but explicit about what that new ground should look like").
81. See Meyer, supra note 78.
82. Meyer, supra note 77, at 545-46 ("Subsequent cases have made it clear that the
Court regards some form of heightened scrutiny as appropriate whenever the state
intrudes significantly upon a parent's basic decision concerning child rearing.").
83. Meyer, supra note 77, at 546.
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rearing decisions, affording heightened protection to those decisions
to which it agrees.
This article argues that the above approaches are not
incompatible. Combined, they reflect a desire by the Court to
balance the competing interests at stake by comparing the
reasonableness of the parent's child-rearing decision to the
reasonableness of the government's infringement on parental
autonomy. What results is a type of childrearing partnership that
balances parental autonomy and the interests of the state based on
considerations of reasonableness.
IV. Case Law Balancing Parental Autonomy with
State Interests
In Meyer v. Nebraska,5 the Supreme Court first articulated
parental autonomy in childrearing as a fundamental liberty interest
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." The
Court stated that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment denotes "the right of the individual to ... establish a
home and bring up children."87 At issue was a Nebraska law that
barred all elementary teachers from teaching in any language other
than English." According to the Court, the decision of a parent to
educate a child in another language was a reasonable decision within
the realm of a parent's right to bring up children. 9 The law unduly
infringed this right, and was therefore invalid.'
Next, the Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters9' addressed an
Oregon law that required all children to attend public school-
denying parents the choice to send their children to nonpublic
schools. According to the Court, the act "unreasonably interfere[d]
with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
84. Meyer, supra note 77, at 547 n.102.
85. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
86. Id. at 399 (The liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment "denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to . .. establish a
home and bring up children ...
87. Id.
88. Id. at 397.
89. See id. at 403 ("No emergency has arisen which renders knowledge by a child of
some language other than English so clearly harmful as to justify its inhibition with the
consequent infringement of rights long freely enjoyed.").
90. See id.
91. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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education of children under their control."' In effect, the parental
decision to send a child to a non-public school was reasonable, and
state denial of that decision was unreasonable. Consequently, the law
was overturned.3
The result was the opposite in Prince v. Massachusetts,94 where
the Court upheld a Massachusetts child labor law. The Court
acknowledged that its prior case law "respected the private realm of
family life which the state cannot enter," but admitted that this realm
is not wholly beyond regulation by the state.95 It argued that when
"[a]cting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state
as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school
attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in many
other ways."" In essence, the Court reasoned that child labor is such
an unreasonable or unacceptable parenting decision that prohibiting
such a decision is a reasonable state intrusion on parental autonomy.
Subsequently, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,7 the Court upheld the right
of Amish parents to withdraw their children from school after the
eighth grade despite a Wisconsin compulsory education law that
required all children to attend school until sixteen years of age.98 The
Court asserted that "a State's interest in universal education ... is not
totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on
fundamental rights and interests . . . ."9 In conducting this balancing
process, the Court acknowledged that the Amish were a long-
standing and accepted religious people who historically exhibited high
moral standards and good citizenship despite their withdrawal from
school after the eighth grade." Supported by this track record, the
92. Id. at 534-35.
93. Id. at 536.
94. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
95. Id. at 166.
96. Id.
97. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
98. Id. at 234.
99. Id. at 214.
100. See id. at 225 ("The Amish alternative to formal secondary school education has
enabled them to function effectively in their day-to-day life under self-imposed limitations
on relations with the world, and to survive and prosper in contemporary society as a
separate, sharply identifiable and highly self-sufficient community for more than 200 years
in this country. In itself this is strong evidence that they are capable of fulfilling the social
and political responsibilities of citizenship without compelled attendance beyond the
eighth grade at the price of jeopardizing their free exercise of religious belief.").
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decision by Amish parents to withdraw their children from school
after the eighth grade was seen by the Court as reasonable.'o'
The Court also assessed the reasonableness of the compulsory
education law's intrusion into parental autonomy. According to the
Court, compulsory education laws are an important state interest, one
that is typically viewed as reasonable.'" Nonetheless, the Court found
that "the evidence adduced by the Amish in this case [was]
persuasively to the effect that an additional one or two years of
formal high school for Amish children in place of their long-
established program of informal vocational education would do little
to serve [the state's] interests."o 3 In effect, the evidence did not
support a showing that the state's infringement on parental autonomy
would serve the state's interest; consequently, the infringement was
unreasonable.'? Following from this, the Court upheld the parent's
decision. 05
As evidenced by the Yoder Court, the reasonableness of a state's
intrusion on parental autonomy likely turns on whether the law serves
the state's interest. "" The Prince Court followed the same analysis
despite the unreasonableness of the parental decision to allow child
101. See id. at 228-29 ("In these terms, Wisconsin's interest in compelling the school
attendance of Amish children to age 16 emerges as somewhat less substantial than
requiring such attendance for children generally.").
102. Id. at 213 ("There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high
responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control
and duration of basic education. Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the
function of a State.").
103. Id. at 222 (alteration in original).
104. See supra note 103 and accompanying text; see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34
("To be sure, the power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be
subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the
health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens. But in this
case, the Amish have introduced persuasive evidence undermining the arguments the
State has advanced to support its claims in terms of the welfare of the child and society as
a whole... . [W]e cannot accept a parens patriae claim of such all-encompassing scope and
with such sweeping potential for broad and unforeseeable application as that urged by the
State. For the reasons stated we hold, with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, that the First
and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the State from compelling respondents to cause
their children to attend formal high school to age 16.").
105. It should also be noted that the presence of infringement on religious freedom in
this case combined with the infringement on parental autonomy led the Court to apply a
comparatively heightened level of scrutiny. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233 ("[Wjhen the interests
of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this
record, more than merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency
of the State' is required to sustain the validity of the State's requirement under the First
Amendment.") (emphasis added).
106. See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
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labor. It asserted that the child labor law was "within the state's
police power" because it was "appropriately designed to reach such
evils" as child labor1 " To be appropriately designed the law need not
be perfectly tailored to the state's interest." According to the Prince
Court, it can regulate more than is necessary and fail to address all
instances of the conduct it is attempting to obviate, at least to a
certain degree."
In summary, in parental autonomy cases the Court acknowledges
the fundamental autonomy of parents in childrearing, but also
acknowledges the fundamental interest of the state to protect the
well-being of children."o The Court balances these competing
interests by weighing the reasonableness of the parent's childrearing
decision and the reasonableness of the state's infringement on
parental autonomy. Despite the reasonableness of the parent's
decision, the reasonableness of the state's infringement turns on an
evidential inquiry into whether the infringement is appropriately
designed to address the state's interest. If the state law is not
designed to do so, then it is unreasonable.
If presented with a reasonable parenting decision and an
unreasonable state infringement, such as in Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder,
the Court will uphold the parent's right to autonomy. On the other
hand, if presented with an unreasonable parenting decision that
threatens the welfare of a child and a reasonable state intrusion-one
that is appropriately designed to address the state's interest-the
Court will uphold the state's infringement, as in Prince.
107. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1944) (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 169.
109. Compare id. ("The case reduces itself therefore to the question whether the
presence of the child's guardian puts a limit to the state's power. That fact may lessen the
likelihood that some evils the legislation seeks to avert will occur. But it cannot forestall
all of them."), with id. at 170 ("Massachusetts has determined that an absolute prohibition,
though one limited to streets and public places and to the incidental uses proscribed, is
necessary to accomplish its legitimate objectives. Its power to attain them is broad enough
to reach these peripheral instances in which the parent's supervision may reduce but
cannot eliminate entirely the ill effects of the prohibited conduct."). See also Yoder, 406
U.S. at 234 ("[W]e cannot accept a parens patriae claim of such all-encompassing scope
and with such sweeping potential for broad and unforeseeable application as that urged by
the State.").
110. See Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 937, 937 (1996) ("For its part, the Supreme Court has adhered to its . . .
pronouncement . . . that parents have a constitutional right to direct and control the
education of their children. . . . Nor has it clarified the terms on which this right coexists
with what the Court has also declared to be the state's fundamental interest in ensuring
that children are educated to be productive individuals and responsible citizens.").
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V. Analysis of Section 270.1 Under the Court's
Balancing Framework
In opposition to Senate Bill 1317, the California Public
Defenders Association, Public Counsel Law Center, and the
American Civil Liberties Union all argued that the legislation was an
infringement on parental autonomy and detrimental to the
relationship between parents and the state."' Since section 270.1
intrudes on parental autonomy, it must be evaluated under the
balancing framework described above. Under this framework, it is
first necessary to determine the reasonableness of the parent's
childrearing decision at issue.
A. Reasonableness of Parents' Childrearing Decision
In regard to section 270.1, the parental decision at issue is
whether or not parents choose to reasonably supervise or encourage
their child's school attendance. Since the Court has expressed that
education of children-at least until the eighth grade-is an
important governmental interest, a parental decision to not
reasonably supervise or encourage their child's attendance is most
likely unreasonable. While it is comparatively more reasonable than
refusing to send a child to school or actively encouraging a child to
skip school, it still threatens the welfare of the child and society at-
large.
The discussion becomes more nuanced when examining the
parental decision at issue compared to those in the Court's prior
jurisprudence on the parent-child relationship. Those decisions
include sending a child to a nonpublic school, receiving instruction in
languages other than English, performing child labor, or withdrawing
from school."2 They all reflect an affirmative expression or action on
the part of the parent, which evidences their decision. Implicit in
these prior cases is the assumption that the child will be effected by or
act according to the parent's childrearing decision. Otherwise, the
state and the Court would not be concerned with protecting the child
111. See supra note 71 and accompanying text; see also SENATE COMM. ON PUB.
SAFETY, 2009-10 REG. SESS., S.B. 1317 BILL ANALYSIS 15 (Cal. May 12, 2010) ("Instead
of creating a new crime that will clog the courts with parents who are surely going to lose
the few jobs that are still held, the Legislature should refocus priorities in ways that help
rather than hurt working class single parents, including safe passage to schools for
elementary school children and universal extended care before and after school.").
112. These are the decisions present in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, Meyer v. Nebraska,
Prince v. Massachusetts, and Wisconsin v. Yoder, respectively.
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from the decision. It is unclear whether this link can be established
between a parent's decision to not reasonably supervise or encourage
a child's school attendance and a child's truancy."'
Research shows that truancy is a complex problem that stems
from a variety of factors. The factors contributing to truancy occur
along a continuum of personal, family, and school issues. These
include social skills, cognitive skills, health problems, learning
disabilities, emotional disorders, socioeconomic status, parenting
skills, family social support, child abuse, child neglect, homelessness,
transportation difficulties, unsafe school environments, victimization
at school, low expectations of students, unsupportive teachers,
inappropriate academic placement, and the presence of delinquent
peers, street gangs, and interracial tensions. Due to the multiplicity of
contributing factors, a direct link between a parent's failure to
reasonably supervise or encourage attendance and truancy is
improbable.
The link between a parent's failure to reasonably supervise or
encourage attendance and truancy becomes more attenuated when
examining the effects of parental involvement on truancy. One study
based on the National Educational Longitudinal Study published in
1999 examined the correlation between parental involvement and
truancy, dropout, and academic achievement in over 11,000 students
from eighth grade forward.H4 Parental involvement was measured as
parent-child discussion,"' parental involvement in the parent-teacher
organization ("PTO"),H6 monitoring,"' and educational support
strategies, such as visiting the school and talking with teachers."'
According to the study, greater parent-child discussion reduced the
likelihood of truancy for white students only, PTO involvement
reduced it for whites and blacks, and monitoring reduced it for whites
113. There is a dearth of empirical research that directly examines this question
because it is difficult to conduct a study on the effects of inaction or inexpression. Instead
this paper will survey the research on the causes of truancy and how affirmative parental
involvement and control affect truancy.
114. See generally, Ralph B. McNeal Jr., Parental Involvement as Social Capital:
Differential Effectiveness on Science Achievement, Truancy, and Dropping Out, 78 Soc.
FORCES 117 (Sept. 1999); see also id. at 127 ("The final sample consists of 11,401 cases.").
115. Id. at 124.
116. Id. at 125.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 126.
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and Hispanics.119  For single-headed households, parent-child
discussion had no correlation to reducing truancy. 120
Furthermore, educational support strategies did not significantly
improve achievement or reduce problematic behavior for any
students.12' "In fact, the few significant findings that do exist indicate
that higher levels of educational support strategies are associated with
slightly higher levels of truancy." 22  The author concluded that
parental involvement only resulted in beneficial gains to advantaged
students-namely white, middle- to upper-class students from intact
households.123  While this study examined the effects of parental
involvement, not disinvolvement, it still reflects a lack of correlation
between parental supervision or encouragement and the school
attendance of disadvantaged children.
Lastly, there is no general agreement among experts as to
whether parents can control the behavior of their children. 24 At the
very least, experts do seem to agree that children of certain, easier
temperaments will respond positively to traditional parental
discipline.125  Nonetheless, one study showed that high levels of
perceived parental strictness result in greater child delinquency than
medium levels.126  This means that, at times, increased or harsh
parental control can lead to greater truancy. Clearly, the effects of
parental control on a child's school attendance are not uniform and,
consequently, are difficult to ascertain or apply broadly.
On the whole, the aforementioned research indicates that
different children are affected differently by varying levels of parental
119. See id. at 131 ("Parent-child discussion significantly reduces the likelihood of
truancy and dropping out only for white students, while there are nonsignificant
relationships for blacks, Hispanics, and Asians. The beneficial influence of PTO
involvement is evident only for whites and blacks, not for Hispanics and Asians; the
beneficial influence of monitoring is evident only for whites when examining truancy and
dropping out and for Hispanics when examining truancy.").
120. Id. at 133.
121. Id. at 136.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 134 ("In many circumstances, what were presumed to be positive influences
of social capital persisted only for members of traditionally advantaged sections of the
population, namely white students, those of middle to upper socioeconomic status, and
those from intact households.").
124. Judith G. McMullen, "You Can't Make Me!": How Expectations of Parental
Control over Adolescents Influence the Law, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 603, 627 (2004).
125. Id. at 640.
126. L. Edward Wells & Joseph H. Rankin, Direct Parental Controls and Delinquency,
26 CRIMINOLOGY 263, 273 (1988).
558 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 39:2
IMPERMISSIBLY CRIMINALIZING TRUANCY
involvement and control. In the Court's prior jurisprudence on the
parent-child relationship, the causal connection between the parent's
affirmative decision and the child's resulting action is strong. It could
well be assumed there that the child acted according to the parent's
decision. Here, the same assumption cannot be made. While some
children will increase their school attendance based on a parent's
reasonable supervision or control, it is unclear how many children will
do so. For this reason, the causal connection between a parent's
failure to reasonably supervise or encourage school attendance and a
child's resulting truancy is tenuous. The parent's decision is still most
likely an unreasonable decision, but the Court should consider the
tenuous causal connection. In my opinion, it reduces the
unreasonableness of the parental decision at issue because the
possible resulting harm to the child is not uniform or broadly
applicable.
B. Reasonableness of the State's Infringement on Parental Autonomy
Despite an unreasonable parental decision, the Court's balancing
framework requires a determination of the reasonableness of the
state's infringement. If the evidence shows that the law is
appropriately designed to address the problem-as in Prince-then
the state infringement is reasonable.27 Here, that requires a showing
of evidence that section 270.1 is appropriately designed to increase
school attendance. Unfortunately, there is a lack of definitive
empirical research as to whether a parental responsibility law will
serve the state's interest in increasing school attendance."' One
statistic published by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention ("OJJDP") on a truancy program in Pima County,
Arizona, indicates that the threat of prosecution reduces truancy. 2 9
127. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
128. Tami Scarola, Creating Problems Rather Than Solving Them: Why Criminal
Parental Responsibility Laws Do Not Fit Within Our Understanding of Justice, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 1029,1045 (1997) ("Little direct statistical analysis is available to show
the effectiveness of the newly-enacted criminal parental responsibility laws. Available
statistics, however, suggest that the laws are not entirely effective in reducing the juvenile
crime rate.").
129. See MYRIAN L. BAKER, JANE NADY SIGMON & M. ELAIN NUGENT, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, TRUANCY
REDUCTION: KEEPING STUDENTS IN SCHOOL 5 (Sept. 2001), available at https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/188947.pdf.
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According to OJJDP, "the threat of prosecution prompted 61 percent
of parents or guardians to take corrective action.",o
The OJJDP determined this by comparing the number of
advisory letters, which threatened criminal prosecution of parents of
truants, with the number of parents subsequently referred to a social
service center due to further absences.131 While the threat of criminal
prosecution certainly played a role in stemming truancy for some
children, it should be noted that the advisory letter was sent after only
one unexcused absence.13 2 It can be reasonably inferred that this was
the first time many parents were informed of their child's absence,
and that some parents took action upon learning of the absence,
regardless of the threat of prosecution. Also, some children might
miss one day of school, while never missing more or intending to be a
chronic truant. Therefore, it is unclear what impact the threat of
prosecution had on the students who stopped missing school after
receipt of the letter.
CTRI also threatened parental prosecution, and it produced
extremely positive results among elementary students in San
Francisco. However, CTRI was also a three-stage pyramid approach
to combating truancy with prosecution being only one of those stages.
The other two stages-widespread education and intervention
through mediation-played a fundamental role. In Kamala Harris'
own words, "[t]hese mediations work. Without hauling a single
parent to court, we saw attendance at one school improve 40 percent
among the students whose families participated in the mediation
sessions.""' Unfortunately, section 270.1 does not provide for
widespread education or intervention through mediation, so CTRI's
success in increasing school attendance cannot be translated into
section 270.1.'3
Researchers and criminologists, such as Peter Greenwood,
director of criminal justice research at RAND, and Barry Krisberg,
president of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, are
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 4.
133. HARRIS, supra note 57, at 11.
134. It should be noted, however, that Harris implemented these stages in San
Francisco under current California truancy laws. So, a county can voluntarily adopt and
implement all of CTRI. If California focused its efforts on assisting each county to
implement a three-stage approach resembling CTRI with the added prosecutorial threat
under section 270.1, then the probability of seeing the same, positive results is greatly
strengthened. This paper will discuss viable options further in section VI.
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skeptical that parental responsibility laws bring about their desired
results."' Meager research on parental responsibility laws provides
some support for this skepticism. For example, in 1979, Oregon
passed a law making the parents of children who shoplift civilly liable.
Parents were held liable for actual damages and the retail value of the
merchandise, along with an additional penalty of between $100 and
$250."' Afterward, incidents of shoplifting in Portland, Oregon,
increased from 2,910 in 1979 to 3,844 in 1980, and increased again to
4,116 in 1981.3 Furthermore, in 2008, the County Solicitor General
of a Georgia county that prosecuted around three hundred parents of
truants in a two-year period acknowledged minimal results-a mere
two to three percent increase in school attendance.38
Slightly more convincing are results from a federally mandated
study that indicate punitive parental consequences do not increase a
child's school attendance. In July of 1987, the State of Wisconsin
enacted "Learnfare," a law that would deny some welfare benefits to
families if their dependent child either failed to enroll in school or
had excessive absences."' In this case, excessive absences meant over
twenty days missed in one semester.140 The United States Department
135. Harris, supra note 10, at 9-10 ("[C]riminologists and legal professionals tend to be
skeptical about parental responsibility laws, at best. Commenting on the state of these
laws enacted during the 1990s, Peter Greenwood . . . said, 'I've never seen any studies to
show that [parental responsibility laws] work,' while he commented favorably about
teaching parenting skills early. During the same time period, Barry Krisberg . . . sharply
criticized the laws:
Most of these laws are a complete waste of time. . . . It's country club
criminology. It sounds good in the suburbs but in reality it's an empty threat
because if you carry it out you just further endanger and pull apart
families.... We have a serious juvenile-crime problem no one wants to
confront, so we end up in an endless search for the delinquency solution of
the month. . . . One month it's tough love. Then it's boot camp. Now it's
parental responsibility.").
136. Kenneth Alvin Kalvig, Comment, Oregon's New Parental Responsibility Acts:
Should Other States Follow Oregon's Trail?, 75 OR. L. REV. 829, 844 (1996).
137. Id.
138. Tristan Smith, Parents of Truant Kids Can Face Jail Time, CNN (Oct. 24,
2008), http://articles.cnn.com/2008-10-24/justice/truancy.arrests_1_anti-truancy-programs-
parenting-classes-school-engagement? s=PM:CRIME.
139. JOHN PAWASARAT, Lois QUINN & FRANK STETZER, UNIV. OF WISCONSIN-
MILWAUKEE, THE EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING INST., EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT
OF WISCONSIN'S LEARNFARE EXPERIMENT ON THE SCHOOL ATTENDANCE OF
TEENAGERS RECEIVING AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN 4 (Feb. 5,
1992) (submitted to the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services and United
States Department. of Health and Human Services), available at http://www4.uwm.edul
eti/reprints/Learnfare92.pdf.
140. Id. at 5.
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of Health and Human Services charged the Employment and
Training Institute of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee with
determining the Learnfare experiment's impact on the school
attendance of the middle and high school students receiving the
benefits.141 The attendance records over a seven-year period of over
24,000 eighth grade students 42 were studied to see if eighth grade
attendance improved under Learnfare.143 Not only did attendance not
improve,'" absences actually increased.45 In one school, the percent
of eighth graders missing more than twenty days rose from twenty to
twenty-five percent from the 1988-89 school year to the 1990-91
school year.146  It is important to note, however, the differences
between Learnfare and section 270.1: Learnfare monetarily sanctions
parents while section 270.1 provides for both fines and jail time, and
Learnfare applied only to eighth graders while section 270.1 applies
to kindergarten through eighth grade. Due to these differences, this
research is not conclusive on the effects of section 270.1, but the
results generally indicate that the threat or enforcement of parental
punishment does not increase school attendance.
Perhaps the best indicator of 270.1's potential failure to address
truancy is the fact that a law imposing criminal liability on parents of
habitual truants-section 272-has been in existence since 1979,147 and
yet truancy has remained a rampant problem in California. By
definition, chronic truants are habitual truants. Therefore, parents
liable under section 270.1 can also be held liable under section 272.
Since section 272 has not addressed truancy, it seems unlikely that a
similar law will accomplish the opposite. However, as discussed
above, some district attorneys report difficulty prosecuting parents
141. Id. at 1-2.
142. Because few seventh graders were monitored under the Learnfare policy, the
eighth grade was used to track attendance over time for middle schools. Id. at 5.
143. See id. at 2 ("School records were collected from the six school districts for all
teens from the community in the study population who were enrolled in school for one or
more semesters. In Milwaukee this population included 32,561 high school students and
24,178 middle school students enrolled from 1984-1985 through 1990-1991. Individual
student records were collected on 5,926 high school and middle school students enrolled
from 1985-1986 through 1990-1991 in the five other school districts studied.").
144. Id. at 19-20 ("Neither district showed improvement in attendance for teens under
the Learnfare requirement .... ).
145. Id. at 20 ("The Milwaukee middle school analysis showed an increase rather than
decrease in absences attributable to the presence of the Learnfare requirement .... The School
A middle school analysis showed an increase rather than decrease in absences. . .
146. Id. at 6 (table Middle School Attendance in School A).
147. See Williams v. Garcetti, 5 Cal. 4th 561, 508 (1993).
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under section 272, and believe section 270.1 will allow for greater
prosecution." If low prosecution rates lessened section 272's effects
on truancy and 270.1 will increase prosecution, then section 270.1
might better address the problem.
In summary, the evidence is inconclusive on whether section
270.1 alone will address the problem of truancy, but it tends to
indicate a low likelihood. Since the Court does not require that the
state's infringement be perfectly tailored to combating truancy, an
inquiry into degree is relevant. One could argue that section 270.1 is
appropriately designed to address the state's interest since the law is
limited in application to parents of young children who have
accumulated excessive absences. In essence, the law is aimed at
eliminating the worst cases of truancy in kindergarten through eighth
grade. However, the research did not indicate a variance of success
depending on the level of truancy targeted. In fact, the study on
Learnfare only examined those students with excessive absences, and
it found that school absences increased after Learnfare. Thus, it
seems that section 270.1, regardless of narrow design, will not
sufficiently address the problem of truancy to be deemed a
reasonable infringement.
While the Court's prior jurisprudence on the parent-child
relationship does not include a situation with an unreasonable
parental decision and an unreasonable state infringement, I argue
that section 270.1 is impermissible for several reasons. First, the
unreasonableness of the parent's childrearing decision rests on a
tenuous link. It is unclear whether and to what degree the decision to
not supervise or encourage school attendance will harm a child.
Second, the evidence points to the fact that 270.1 will not produce its
desired results, and yet it is a severe intrusion on parental autonomy.
Lastly, parental autonomy is a fundamental right protected under the
Constitution. These factors weigh in favor of overturning section
270.1.
VI. Viable Options
Since truancy is still a serious problem in California, the state
should explore other options. Statistics from CTRI tend to indicate
that CTRI would adequately serve the state's interest in increasing
school attendance. Compared to section 270.1, CTRI presents a
much stronger argument for warranting intrusion into parental
148. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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autonomy, but each stage of the approach must be implemented-not
just the prosecution stage.
Nevertheless, any approach that focuses on criminally
prosecuting parents can result in removing a parent from the home-
in this case, for up to a year. This is a serious consequence, and one
should consider the impact of this on the child, to whom the law is
ultimately trying to help. Opinions from the legal community reflect
the negative impact that removing a parent from the home can have
on a child. According to a publication from the American Bar
Association Standing Committee on Substance Abuse, Truancy,
Literacy and the Courts, "removing a parent from the home in order
to impress on them the importance of parenting is absurd." 149 The
members of the California Justice Department seem to agree, as the
legislature's prior attempt to hold parents responsible for their child's
delinquency-section 272-has mainly been used for rehabilitative
purposes rather than punishment.'
Furthermore, in a 2004 review of compulsory education laws by
California's Legislative Analyst's Office ("LAO"), LAO reported
that "many of the district attorneys we spoke with stated that the
focus of the court is not to penalize the parent with fines or to
incarcerate the parent but to provide opportunities for the parent to
change the negative behavior pattern for which they are being
prosecuted."' This resistance to parental prosecution is not unique
to California district attorneys; a study on enforcement of Oregon
parental responsibility laws showed the same aversion.52 Viewed in
this light, CTRI may not be the best approach, even if it will increase
school attendance.
149. AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDING COMM. ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE, TRUANCY, LITERACY
AND THE COURTS: A USER'S MANUAL FOR SETTING UP A TRUANCY INTERVENTION
PROGRAM 1 (2001), available at http://www2.americanbar.org/BlueprintForChange/
Documents/Truancy%20Literacy%20and%20the%20Courts.pdf.
150. Howard Davidson, No Consequences-Re-examining Parental Responsibility
Laws, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 27 (1996) ("There appears to have been sparing
application of this California law, although one early 1995 report indicated that in 1994 the
Los Angeles City Attorney's Gang Unit, which helped craft the statute, had sent 1,000
parents to counseling or classes (presumably, under the threat of possible prosecution);
only two parents who refused to cooperate with the Unit were actually prosecuted.").
151. A Review of California's Compulsory Education Laws, LEGISLATIVE
ANALYST'S OFFICE (Feb. 2004), http://www.1ao.ca.gov/2004/compulsory-ed/020304
compulsory-educationlaws.htm.
152. Harris, supra note 10, at 23 ("Formal prosecution for violation of parental
responsibility laws was very uncommon; fourteen of the twenty-six district attorneys said
that they never prosecute, and another six said that they prosecute only one to three times
per year. The remaining six said that they prosecute four to eleven times per year.").
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Options that do not provide for parental liability do exist. In
2008, the Washington legislature directed the Washington State
Institute for Public Policy to study truancy, leading to the publication
of a 2009 report on evidence-based intervention and prevention
programs for truancy among middle and high school students."
Overall, the institute reviewed 877 school, court, and law enforcement
agency programs and over 460 publications." The institute found
that only three types of intervention have been proven to improve
student attendance and enrollment: alternative educational
programs,"' behavioral programs,'5 6 and school-based mentoring."' In
addition, the institute also found that alternative educational
programs not only improve attendance and enrollment, but also lead
to fewer dropouts, higher test scores and grades, and higher
graduation rates.5  Alternative educational programs are defined as
"[p]rograms involving a group of students in a traditional school (e.g.,
school-within-a-school) that usually offer small class size, more
individualized instruction, and/or different instructional methods and
material (e.g., vocational curriculum)."' This approach to combating
truancy, which does not result in parental prosecution, has shown
positive academic results along with reducing truancy.
Considering the numerous factors that lead to truancy, a solution
that works in one location may not work in another due to different
school or community environments. For this reason, the best option
may be to initiate pilot programs, such as CTRI or alternative
153. WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, WHAT WORKS? TARGETED TRUANCY
AND DROPOUT PROGRAMS IN MIDDLE AND HIGH SCHOOL 1 (June 2009), available at
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/09-06-2201.pdf.
154. Id. at 3.
155. Alternative educational programs are defined as "[plrograms involving a group of
students in a traditional school (e.g., school-within-a-school) that usually offer small class
size, more individualized instruction, and/or different instructional methods and material
(e.g., vocational curriculum)." Id. at 6.
156. Behavioral programs are defined as "[t]argeting students' school behaviors by
helping them analyze and problem-solve negative behaviors, and/or by establishing a
system of contingencies (rewards, punishments) for desirable and undesirable behaviors."
Id.
157. Mentoring is defined as "[pjroviding students with positive role models, who help
with specific academic issues (e.g., homework), advocate for the student in the school
system, and connect them to other services (e.g., social services)." Exhibit two, titled
Effects of Truancy and Dropout Programs for Middle and High School Students on School
Outcomes, shows that these three programs are the only three to have a positive effect on
truancy. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. (alteration in original).
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educational programs. These programs can be studied to determine
which responses to truancy work and where they work. Then, the
state can formulate an approach that will be effective at combating
truancy statewide while serving its interest and respecting parental
autonomy.
While pilot programs may be expensive, the expense can be
diverted from other truancy mandates. For example, the funds spent
prosecuting or imprisoning parents of truants under section 270.1
might be better spent developing pilot programs. Also, the funds
spent on sending truancy notification letters to parents under current
laws could instead be used on pilot programs. In 2010 alone, LAO
estimated the annual cost of sending these notification letters at $25
Million." LAO has already recommended dispensing with
notification letters because they are "broadly duplicative of other
requirements" and do "little to increase parental involvement or
reduce dropout rates."16  Therefore, the state may want to reassess
where funds are needed most, and sacrifice current futile policies in
order to divert those funds to truancy approaches that show promise.
Conclusion
According to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, parental
autonomy in childrearing is a fundamental right, but the state's
interest in protecting the welfare of children keeps the Court from
applying strict scrutiny to cases that infringe this right. What results is
a balancing test where the court weighs the reasonableness of a
parent's childrearing decision and the reasonableness of the state's
infringement on parental autonomy.
With regard to section 270.1, a parent's decision to not properly
supervise or encourage a child's attendance is most likely
unreasonable, but the causal connection between the decision and the
resulting action is tenuous. On the other hand, the reasonableness of
the state's infringement is determined by whether evidence shows the
law is appropriately designed to serve the state's interest. The
evidence is inconclusive here, but indicates that section 270.1 will not
adequately increase school attendance. This, coupled with section
270.1's severe infringement on parental autonomy and the
160. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, EDUCATION MANDATES: OVERHAULING A
BROKEN SYSTEM' 16 (Feb. 2010) available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2010/edu/
educmandates/edmandates_020210.pdf.
161. Id.
[Vol. 39:2566 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Winter 2012] IMPERMISSIBLY CRIMINALIZING TRUANCY 567
fundamental right at issue, weighs in favor of overturning section
270.1.
Other viable options do exist, such as CTRI and alternative
educational programs, and these options should be considered in light
of the harmful effect parental prosecution could have on the child.
The best option for increasing school attendance is to initiate and
study pilot programs, such as alternative educational programs, to
determine which programs produce positive results without risking
further harm to the child, and to implement these programs based on
measurable results.
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